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Why can’t all the countries see that a lot of refugees don’t belong in Europe?
[Who] does belong to Europe? Perhaps [the] Celts should kick all us new-
comers out?
(Quora dialogue, October 20161)
Some of the key problematics discussed in literature on European heritage – 
including in this book – concern the politically instrumental construction of a 
shared past, implicating shared values and identities, designed to fashion a trans-
national demos from numerous national citizenries. This is a project to constitute 
a ‘people’ who make up a collective singularity, however internally diverse, by 
virtue of perceived affinity, territorial co- presence and sense of connection to a 
common, coherent and evident historical story from which moral lessons can 
and have been learned (see also Eder, 2014). A significant paradox within this – 
one that is, for the moment, probably insoluble – is the tension between different 
dimensions of collectivity and belonging, and in particular the difficulty of 
balancing national and trans- or supranational belongings, of feeling oneself 
simultaneously a national and a European citizen (Giddens, 2014, p. 151; Sierp, 
2014; Guibernau, 2007, pp. 92, 113). Belonging, we suggest, is a kind of meta- 
dimension of European heritage. As Montserrat Guibernau argues, belonging to 
a collectivity gives life meaning; it ‘offers a vantage point from which human 
beings are able to transcend their limited existence by sharing some common 
interests, objectives and characteristics with fellow- members’, and can be an 
antidote to alienation (Guibernau, 2013, pp. 2, 4). As we have seen in this book, 
the construction or sense of a shared heritage is entangled with affirmations of 
belonging at the level of rhetoric and policy. But what happens at the level 
of practice? What happens when heritage is involved in refusals of belonging, or 
when belonging is tacitly or overtly denied to some people? This final chapter 
takes up these questions, mining some of our ethnographies for support. One of 
these is the basis for a short diversion to a Turkish coffeehouse in what used to 
be the edge of West Berlin. This is a marginal story that turns out to be central, 
allowing us to suggest that among the multiple Europes circulating and bickering 
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in the air around us, there are still some others yet to be brought into sight. After 
this, we close the book with some practical comments about what, in this time of 
perceived crisis, should be done to re- orient ideas of the European past at the 
level of heritage practice.
Belonging to the past
Heritage and belonging go back a long way. As Pierre Nora explains, heritage 
traditionally referred to ‘goods and properties you inherited from your father 
or your mother’ (Nora, 2011, p. ix); today, it refers to the ‘goods and prop-
erties of a group which help define the identity of that group’. But, Nora 
argues, the meaning of heritage has been enormously extended, in fact, since 
we ‘readily speak today of a linguistic, cultural or genetic heritage’ (Nora, 
2011, p. ix) giving us a range of possibilities and indices for constructions of 
belonging. Belonging brings its connotations of ownership of heritage, as 
Nora’s comment suggests, along with an inverse sense of being owned by 
one’s heritage, or ‘belonging to’ places, peoples, historical narratives or mix-
tures of these. This also returns us to the idea of disinheritance (Tunbridge and 
Ashworth, 1996), which is to say that assertions relating to group heritage 
necessarily alienate others. As senses of belonging are made, so too are senses 
of non- belonging.
 In one of its dictionary definitions, ‘to belong’ is to be ‘rightly assigned to a 
specified category’ – a phrase full of constructive problems: why are there cat-
egories, and who specifies them? Who can ‘assign’ something or someone to a 
category? And on what basis do we understand that such assignment might be 
right or wrong? Another dictionary definition of ‘belonging’ is to ‘have the right 
personal or social qualities to be a member of a particular group’. But what 
group (more fundamentally, why groups at all?), which qualities and why right 
or wrong? As discussed in Chapter 1, in 2016 Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán 
exhorted citizens to vote for a ‘Zero Refugees’ policy by arguing that the altern-
ative was to lose ‘our European values, our very identity, by degrees like the live 
frog allowing itself to be slowly cooked to death in a pan of water’, which was 
the discursive and defensive construction of an in- group and a threatening out-
group, as much as it was a tactical mobilisation of Europeanness as a cover for 
an anti- EU position and what Orbán saw as a national interest.
 Anthony Giddens’ notion of the ‘reflexive project of the self ’ (1991) involves 
the suggestion that lapses in the weight upon our lives of tradition and customs 
mean that the self has to be created and recreated more actively. The self, in this 
view, is not essential or fixed but is a form of projection relying on arrays of 
possibilities, some of which may be found before our lives so long as they have 
sufficient publicity to be discoverable by us and some form of continuity can be 
construed (for example, ‘Viking’ has more publicity and positive connotations 
than ‘Norman’ in the UK, making it arguably a more available referent for 
identities). This search for meaning often relies on anchorings in the past, or in 
time- place-people formations, through which subjects can create narratives of 
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continuity and allay anxieties about identity that result from less stable social 
and cultural situations.
 This is the ‘self- in-history’ that has been discussed at length in this book. 
One’s self- in-history is a strategic and elective construction of a historicised self, 
often based upon the precedence of one’s forebears with whom we feel we share 
something, whether it is blood, religion, politics, class or land occupancy. It is a 
matter of how – through what ‘cultural device’ as historian Geoffrey Cubitt 
(2007, p. 15) would call it – we ‘relate’ to the past and identify, perform and 
pattern it in our own contemporary personhood, whether in our appearance or in 
our interiorised practice of the self. The self- in-history is a sense of some kind of 
literal or psychic descendance and the inheritance that brings, whether it is an 
affective burden, a tactic of distinction and specialness, a justification for the 
adoption of characteristics or beliefs (including enmities) or a group belonging 
that provides meaning. The (chosen) past here is a reservoir of symbols whose 
‘necessary ambiguity’ render them pliable for adoption and adaptation (Guiber-
nau, 2013, p. 27).
 Drawing lines between ourselves and the inhabitants of that foreign country 
that is the past (Lowenthal, 1985) is obviously a creative practice. It is, as it 
were, like a mental map in which we plot ourselves as part of historical time, 
with all of its jumps, elisions, gaps and wormholes. Such mapping involves spe-
cific historiographical liabilities, for it involves an attempt both to think oneself 
into the past and the past into oneself. It is to connect backwards, irrespective of 
the potential disconnections that distance us from our forebears, because our 
different situations may produce radically different forms of perception and con-
sciousness from the inhabitants of the past with whom we identify (Cubitt, 2007; 
Watson 2015, p. 290). It also brings up the likelihood of our selective identifica-
tions with and remakings of the past, which has been a recurrent theme in this 
book. Nevertheless, it forms the basis for a compound sense of belonging to a 
historical community of the past, comprising both the dead and the living, and 
an overlapping memory community of the present. But to how many pasts, 
places and peoples can we belong?
A European self- in-history?
For a cosmopolitan elite, a holding- together of national and European senses of 
belonging and identity may feel easy. It is the collapse of the us- them distinction 
into a soft binary, where ‘we’ can cover either a national or a European demos 
(‘we Germans’, ‘we Europeans’), depending on the context of an utterance. It is 
a ‘both- and’, rather than an ‘either- or’ position (Macdonald and Fausser, 2000). 
When we interviewed visitors at the House of European History (HEH) in Brus-
sels in 2017 (shortly after its opening), many adopted this ‘both- and’ position, as 
one might expect on an assumption that a pro- EU audience self- selects in choos-
ing to visit such a museum. In our questionnaire, some of our respondents chose 
to put ‘European’ ahead of their national identities in terms of personal signifi-
cance.2 Current political developments have meant that, in some quarters, 
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 anti- EU sentiment has positively bolstered European identity (Delanty, 2018, 
p. 203), as in the case of the EU- flag-waving ‘Remainers’ who protested against 
Brexit in their tens of thousands in the streets of Westminster (Figure 10.1). In 
our time at HEH we also encountered people who had not really considered or 
championed their ‘European’ identities until political events like Brexit com-
pelled them to do so. When do identity formations come into view? Anthony 
Giddens discusses Vaclav Havel’s meditation on the timing of European identity 
as a recent development in its conscious and reflexive form. It is recent because 
identifying ourselves is now and only now a pre- requisite for co- existing with 
others in a ‘multicultural and multipolar world’ (Havel in Giddens, 2014, 
p. 152). If European identity was largely unreflexive until recently it was, Havel 
argues, because Europe felt that it was the world, making identity superfluous. In 
other words, a new consciousness of otherness, of disparate positions and our 
Figure 10.1  ‘Remainers’ protesting against the Brexit referendum result in July 2016, 
Westminster, London
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own contingent positions compels us to identify ourselves as a matter of emer-
gency. It is part of a rescue version of what Richard Jenkins (2008, p. 5) calls the 
‘multi- dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places 
in it, as individuals and as members of collectivities’ (Jenkins, 2008, p. 5).
 But recent pro- EU sentiment and the ‘reflexive Europeanisation’ it often 
involves have of course also bolstered nationalist senses of self, amplifying 
European and national identity positions among respective groups and the antag-
onism between them dynamically. Indeed, for many citizens, the holding- 
together of national and European identities is a nonsense easily trumped by 
emotional attachments to the nation that are not transferable to the EU (Guiber-
nau, 2007, p. 116). As it happens, not all of the HEH visitors whom we surveyed 
were ‘EUrophiles’. As one UK visitor noted:
I voted to leave [the EU], mainly because we can remember what it was like 
before we joined… We [British] made our own laws, and our own decisions 
about things, and we didn’t just, ‘Oh, it’s alright,’ you know, it’s everybody 
… just too much of everybody. We don’t seem to have any … we can’t 
seem to stop the amount of people, and the amount of changes, and every-
thing coming into it. We are losing our identity, that’s what I wanted to say. 
Other countries seem to keep their identity a lot more, and we are keeping 
our identity, so I voted to come out. 
(HEH1, pers. comms., 2017)
This is not merely a characteristic of UK debates. Denials of commonality and 
common heritage can also be found, for example, in the Europe of Freedom and 
Direct Democracy (EFDD) charter’s position that discrete national heritages 
should be strengthened, national borders protected and that ‘there is no such 
thing as a single European people’.3 Likewise, Delanty (2018, p. 190) has argued 
against the uniqueness of Brexit, pointing out comparable nationalist sentiments 
in other European settings.
 At the same time, the nation is hardly the only available dimension of collec-
tivity; it fails too, sometimes marked by the attempted secession of regions, or 
people’s attempts to find in history, religion or other commonalities a shared 
identity and sense of belonging in place, time and society. In a sense, this is the 
quest for an alternative imagined community (Anderson, 1983). For some of our 
visitors, this manifested itself in a desire for a smaller, more centralised, less 
eastern or more northern European Union; other respondents surveyed elsewhere 
identified variously Nordic, Mediterranean, Viking, Celtic or class- based 
collectivities. 
 Heritage is one of the primary means through which senses of belonging are 
identified and constructed. Together, heritage and belonging are part of critical 
discursive formations that configure ideas of collectivity in Europe: who 
‘belongs’ together, where and why; and who does not belong, and why not. 
What part do strategies of future- making and tactical framings and uses of heri-
tage play in this? As seen in Chapter 3, the instruments that work to construct a 
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heritage demos are ‘soft’ ones. In one view, this is right and proper: hard instru-
ments would be problematic, since the very heritage values that are promoted 
derive from the idea of counteracting a history of totalitarianism and, in other 
temporal moments and geographic regions, religious dogmatism imposed norm-
atively and oppressively. However soft, the identification and transmission of a 
‘European heritage’ has the potential to function as an irritant for some, as an 
imposition against which to react and posit a contrasting self- in-history. This is 
at its most obvious in the Brexit context, as with the visitor above who com-
plains about the EU representing, or being made up of, ‘too much of everybody’.
 Notwithstanding the urgency of thinking through European identities, in a 
number of cases our visitors had what could be called functionalist European 
identities that were relatively unreflexive, classing themselves as having Euro-
pean identities by dint, for example, of their faculty to travel freely in Europe, 
without particular historical consideration of where that particular ‘freedom’ 
came from and what it means at an ethico- political level. On the other hand, we 
found in our HEH research that many people do profoundly identify with typical, 
historically- rooted ‘European values’. Here is one of our respondents:
‘European’, first, is a region in the world where we share a lot of diversity. 
A very distinct cultural heritage. Not always without conflicts, but neverthe-
less, very deep. The feared reminiscences of wars of the past are always 
something that hold people together, even if they were on different sides. 
Being European today is a very distinct minority approach in the world, 
which is based on some common institutions, beliefs and procedures like 
rule of law, like democracy, like human rights; that deserve to be defended, 
maintained and hopefully improved; because not everything is great.
(HEH2, pers. com., 2017)
This sounds remarkably like the preamble to a European- level heritage instrument. 
Indeed, it may not surprise the reader to learn that the visitor in question (who was 
approached as part of a random sample) worked for the Council of the EU, 
although in a field unconnected to heritage issues. (Tellingly, his department was 
having a group outing to the museum, although participation was voluntary.)
 A raft of heritage manifestos has made the same case, essentially trying to 
deepen the ideal of ‘unity in diversity’ into something grounded in both history 
and practice. For example, in 2007 the COE’s European Manifesto for Multiple 
Cultural Affiliation attempted to:
show how the feeling, on the part of certain individuals or groups, of 
belonging to several cultural traditions at the same time can be reconciled 
with a European citizenship now in the making, based on mutual recogni-
tion of different cultures and an attachment to shared values,
by highlighting ‘the mass of exchanges and the intermingling that has forged 
Europe’s culture’.4 Just over ten years later, on the back of the 2018 European 
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Year of Cultural Heritage, the Berlin Call to Action was published, reiterating 
the centrality of heritage within European politics and echoing the familiar 
instrumental idea of heritage as a means of forging a positive narrative linking 
past and future:
Today, in this European Year of Cultural Heritage, we have a unique oppor-
tunity to influence the debate on the Future of Europe. Confronted with so 
many challenges, and even threats, to core European values, this debate 
cannot be based exclusively on political, economic or security considera-
tions. We must ‘change the tone’ of the narrative about Europe. We must 
put our shared cultural heritage where it belongs: at the very centre of 
Europe’s policies and priorities.5
But if this identity positioning, or this collective self- in-history, is not common 
across the piece, and European heritage instruments continue to preach only to 
the choir or to go under the radar of general consciousness, then a European 
heritage is inherently liable to falter. Its success as a totalising discourse neces-
sarily depends on its large- scale and comprehensive purchase. But that purchase 
is only ever likely to be partial because of the diversity of positions across 
nation- states and orders of memory, including disinvestments in European 
belonging or the failure of the EU to create an appropriate dimension of belong-
ing for all. At the same time, the very urgency of manifestos such as the Berlin 
Call to Action was the increased purchase of right- wing populist uses of the past 
that are seen by many official heritage actors to be misleading, both in the sense 
of inaccuracy and of leading people down the wrong path. The response to these 
uses of the past is to make the case that cultural pluralism – the ‘diversity’ within 
the ‘unity’ – has a long and specific history. For example, the first of seven 
‘rationales for action’ presented in the manifesto is:
Our cultural heritage is what makes us European as it reflects our varying 
and shared values, cultures and memories. Therefore, it is the true embodi-
ment of Europe’s ‘Unity in Diversity’ and it helps us resist divisive forces 
which are a danger to our society.
(Our emphasis)6
Nevertheless, a number of challenges beset the identification of European heri-
tage, alongside the ontological bind outlined at the beginning of the book 
wherein ‘Europe’ and ‘European heritage’ effectively rely on and validate one 
another. These challenges are: (i) whether it is really possible to claim that there 
is significant distinctiveness in European heritage to warrant its marking- out as 
a discrete entity (Lowenthal, 2004, p. 23; Giddens, 2014, pp. 150–152); 
(ii) whether it is predominantly endogenous and contained within Europe, and if 
not then how (on earth) can it be understood? (Delanty, 2018); and (iii) whether 
it is really possible to talk convincingly about a European shared past and a 
shared culture, when what divides Europeans may be more significant than what 
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unites them (Guibernau, 2007, 99–112). Finally (iv), what is that shared past? 
What does it contain and what has been silenced?
 Meanwhile, it can feel like European- level heritage instruments discussed in 
Chapter 3 are also more generally applicable and are not inherently specific to 
Europe, whatever their Europeanising rhetoric. This is the case, for example, 
with the Faro Convention, the European Landscape Convention or with the 
European Heritage Label. The latter, although specific to Europe in the sense 
that it requires alignment with European historical concerns, in many ways 
resembles an adapted, more limited version of the UNESCO World Heritage List 
without the full universalist reach. Indeed, another manifesto produced in con-
nection with EYCH (and in dialectical relations with the Berlin Call to Action), 
was Fast Forward Heritage, published by the heritage- sectoral, EU- funded 
group Culture Action Europe in 2018. This manifesto develops the concept of 
‘European added value’ as a guiding principle both sidestepping the universalism 
of UNESCO and overcoming the insularity and introversion typical of the right- 
wing populist nationalisms that seemed to radically threaten the European 
project:
European added value is found primarily in cross- border cooperation, 
actions that address, reach and benefit the citizens of Europe, and enhance 
mutual knowledge of their cultures. In times of growing inequality and 
polarisation within Europe and beyond, actions funded in the field of cul-
tural heritage should be carefully assessed to ensure their European added 
value for EU citizens as a whole. A strong commitment to European values 
should be explicitly inscribed in the policy legacy of the EYCH.7
One problem with all of these sentiments is how far they travel and what they 
actually do. Significant EU funding (some of which has led to this book) and 
great amounts of political and personal effort go into the project of identifying 
European heritage and making of it a force for good, while simultaneously 
taking the pulse of European collective solidarity. But our impression is that 
within wider heritage practice contexts there can be little knowledge of or atten-
tion to all of this work (although more research would be needed to evaluate this 
claim). We can recall, for example, the lack of traction of the EYCH 2018 
Ringing for Peace event in the UK discussed in the last chapter. And since the 
instruments of heritage policy are soft ones, perhaps we are inevitably tram-
melled into situations of practice where ‘European heritage’ is simultaneously 
championed and ignored respectively by its adherents and ‘the rest’ across the 
heritage sector.
 Nevertheless, in all of these positionings we see a need to deal with a par-
ticular sense of crisis that is very much of the present. As we have seen over the 
course of this book, crisis is a key catchword that can amplify itself, and there is 
disagreement about what the crises that affect us are, who is responsible and 
what are the causes or symptoms. While for some, crisis is caused by the imposi-
tion of difference (primarily through migration, whether from the EU or 
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outwith), for the authors of the sectoral manifestos noted above there is a crisis 
of heritage itself, where what is at stake is control over narratives and exerting 
power over the passions they provoke. This is a crisis because of the moment in 
which we find ourselves, when political actors do not always worry about truth 
and accuracy; when the past is bent to horribly uncivil purpose in the present 
through selective remembering; and when formative pasts of cultural exchange, 
exogenous influence or colonial wrongdoing are glossed or forgotten, as is the 
fact that the nation- state as a geopolitical formation is neither old (relatively 
speaking) nor ordained, and therefore might not need to be the default collectiv-
ity to which we attach our identities.
Crisis talk
This concept, Europe, will make the common foundation of our civilisation 
clear to all of us and create little by little a link similar to the one with 
which the nations were forged in the past.
(Robert Schumann)
In these times of crisis and these years of remembrance of the 1914–18 war, 
we must not forget that the European Union and the Euro have maintained 
solidarity between Europeans. A hundred years ago, nationalism and com-
petition between nations led us to war.
(Thierry Meeùs)
Both of these quotations preface the guidebook to Mini- Europe, a theme park 
in Brussels in which models of key European buildings are presented in a 
1:25-scale miniaturised Europe (although this is Europe as the EU, for non- 
member states are absent). Alongside these quotations are portraits of and 
endorsements from high- profile contemporary EU politicians: Schulz, Tusk, 
Junker, Mogherini. Some of the models move: for example, you can see the 
Berlin Wall being constantly demolished by a tiny mechanical digger. Indeed, 
Mini- Europe seems to be on the fun and cheesy side of things – a tractable, ludic 
Europe where we can stride around landmarks like giants. Yet its framings in 
EU political agendas are explicit and its construction of European values from 
the past is hardly jocular. Here is the roll call: Democracy, Spirit of Adventure, 
Spirit of Enterprise, Technology, Culture and Influence, the Christian Heritage, 
Social Thinking, Secularism and Multiculturalism. These things – it is posited – 
made Europe and Europeans what they are, and need to be remembered ‘in these 
times of crisis’.
 A sense that we are in crisis, as has been discussed, is often entangled with a 
kind of search for the self. Who are we? What firm lines can be drawn that help 
us to define our positions and make sense of disadvantage and social relations? 
To which pasts can we anchor ourselves, and what has gone wrong? As Delanty 
(2018, 196) argues, ‘it is in moments of crisis that identities are nurtured’. A 
range of other commentators on heritage have made links between crisis and 
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people’s turns towards the past. Rodney Harrison, for example, discusses the 
‘unholy trilogy of heritage, threat and the perception of difference’, arguing that 
the ‘strongest notion of heritage will always emerge among those individuals 
and communities who feel their sense of identity and community is most threat-
ened, and who seek to empower themselves to resist this process in some way’. 
This is as much, if not more, likely to be a majority construction than it is a 
minority one (Harrison, 2013, p. 164). Indeed, his argument is that in some cases 
majority groups have appropriated the tactics of minorities: claiming to have 
been deprived of rights and proper traditions, to be discriminated against, to have 
been abused unfairly (Harrison, 2013, p. 163). Thus they forge an aggressively 
mythologised self- in-history, opening up the possibility of claiming victimhood 
that in turn warrants xenophobic and potentially violent reprisals (see also 
Wetherell’s discussion of Paul Gilroy’s 2004 articulation of ‘postcolonial melan-
cholia’: 2012, p. 7). The very privileging of ‘diversity’ and one’s ‘rights’ to 
one’s distinct culture in policy instruments (such as the 2001 UNESCO Uni-
versal Declaration on Cultural Diversity) is intended to accommodate acceptance 
of cultural pluralism, but can in some sense open the way for acts of differencing 
and antagonistic defensiveness. We might also take from Anthony Giddens 
(1991) to argue that when crises upset people’s ‘ontological security’ the ordered 
past becomes a kind of haven from uncertainty (see also Jenkins, 2008, p. 48), 
which is one reason why questions of power and control over historical narrat-
ives are so pressing.
 But again, what counts as crisis? In a cynical sense, all of this time spent and 
ink spilled about identities and histories at a time of ‘European Crisis’ might 
look like so much ‘navel- gazing’ in comparison with the plight of people in 
blighted regions of the global south and east. As journalist Jonathan Friedland 
put it, ‘we’ve been too busy with the [Irish] backstop to notice the world’, 
leading us to forget about ‘warming oceans, war in Yemen, the fate of the 
Uighurs, Gaza…’8 In some ways the ‘European crisis’ mooted at the beginning 
of this book is precisely one where things are not terminal, or rather (the sense 
is), not yet. The patient can still recover at this turning point, not so much at the 
political level of a sustainable union of nations, but at the level of endemic threat 
to people’s lives. The crisis is one in whose effects are not – for most people – 
matters of life and death. We recognise that austerity poverty in Europe may 
have had deadly effects, and we must remember individual acts of deadly viol-
ence that can be linked to European crises, such as the Oslo and Utøya massacre 
of 2011; the murders of UK MP Jo Cox in 2016 and Mayor of Gdańsk Paweł 
Adamowicz in 2019; and the possibility of a return to the Troubles in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland, heralded by the failed Derry bomb attack of 20 January 
2019, that was arguably abetted by the hard border problem created by Brexit. 
But these horrors are not (yet?) widescale.
 A crisis is a time of ‘intense difficulty and danger’ as the Oxford English 
 Dictionary puts it, where a ‘critical situation or problem’ has ‘the potential to 
become disastrous’. But there are other layered meanings to the word. In the past, 
‘crisis’ was used for moments when stark alternatives came into view – right or 
Figure 10.2  Monument to the Women in World War II, Whitehall, London, with an 
ephemeral memorial to MP Jo Cox, murdered as she campaigned for a 
Remain vote by an extreme right-wing terrorist in the name of British inde-
pendence from Europe.
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wrong, salvation or damnation, life or death, where one thing or another would 
come to pass (Koselleck, 2006). Crisis is, in this sense, a crucial point, a crossing 
from one condition to another. This is a time of European crisis only insofar as 
there is still space to turn to the past for reference, in which a long- term political 
future is still debated, and in which horror and deadly violence have not wiped 
from the mind any possibility of reflexivity and reflection. It is a crisis, in other 
words, where identity plays can still happen, and the anxieties voiced by comment-
ators about the incipient dangers of forgetting, and slipping into a modern rerun-
ning of the 1930s (e.g. Sands, 2017; cf. Levi and Rothberg 2018), are still just 
forebodings. Anything more than this would be to move beyond crisis into 
catastrophe.
Belonging and the hidden heritages of Europe
We used to throw stones at the Russian soldiers manning the Wall!
(K1, pers. comm., 2018)
We are in the 60th anniversary of the Turkish immigration and it is 
important to maintain our values from the homeland. We are making an 
effort to keep our culture alive. Think of the obligation9 that was entrusted 
to us when the [Turkish] Republic was established…. When we look at the 
young generations here they enjoy rap music with swearwords. They have 
become more European, because three generations [of the Turkish com-
munity in Germany] have passed. Today’s youth grow up like Germans. 
That’s what Europeans want to do over time: make us forget Turkishness 
and integrate to Europe. However, as a matter of fact, you are a foreigner 
for Europe.
(K2, pers. comm., 2018)
Here we are in a typically Turkish coffeehouse, or kahvehane. But we are in 
Berlin. The coffeehouse is in many senses an unofficial heritage site, or a site 
of heritage. Traditions are observed, but without any particular rituals. Cus-
tomers – all male – pass the time by chatting, watching football, drinking 
Turkish tea and playing okey or backgammon (both games, as it happens, 
with complex, global cultural histories of their own). Our respondents – 
speaking in Turkish10 – reflect on their identities, on citizenship and on their 
past in Berlin. They, or their parents, came here as ‘guest workers’ after the 
Bilateral Agreement of 1961 between Germany and Turkey, to service the 
post- war German Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) and to make up for 
the labour force lost to West Germany after the building of the Berlin Wall in 
the same year. The neighbourhood of Kreuzberg became an edge place, 
butting up against the Wall: a margin where the guest workers were settled as 
a marginal and (it was thought) temporary community. Now it is a fast- 
gentrifying central location.
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 The Turks were not the only guest workers: southern Italians, Moroccans, 
Tunisians, Greeks and others all worked in West German mines or the factories 
of Daimler- Benz. But it is the large Turkish population that has been at the invis-
ible centre of a lost history of Europe. In his 1975 book A Seventh Man with 
photographer Jean Mohr, John Berger recognised in the experience and position 
of the migrant worker (what ‘surrounds him’ both ‘physically and historically’) 
the ‘political reality of the world at this moment’ expressed in a European story 
of capitalist modernity based on the unheeding exploitation of others. ‘The 
migrant is not on the margin of modern experience – he is absolutely central to 
it’ (Berger and Mohr, 2010 [1975]). Berger’s point can be extended: Europe has 
come to be as it is, because of the invisible migrant labour which is a funda-
mental part of its making.
 In another sense about European ‘centrality’, the first of the two quotations 
above, where one of our respondents recalls how he and his friends would ‘throw 
stones at the Russians’, shows the connection of the Turkish guest- worker com-
munity to cardinal stories and monuments of the European heritage record such 
as the Berlin Wall. It is paradoxical that they were situated next to such an icon 
of European history – one that we even find in the Mini- Europe theme park – yet 
are so invisible in that heritage record. But neither of these facts is coincidental. 
In the 2010 re- edition of A Seventh Man, Berger and Mohr recall their surprise 
that their book was ignored in Europe upon its first publication (2010, p. 8). In a 
similar way, the European post- war pasts of economic migration and inter-
national pacts, and the global economic inequalities upon which they were 
Figure 10.3  Café Wrangel in Kreuzberg, Berlin, a heritage site of sorts, where we con-
ducted interviews with Turkish former guest workers about negotiating iden-
tity and belonging in Germany.
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based, were largely lost to the heritage record. But perhaps European heritage 
depends upon its silences. We can argue, alongside Gurminder K. Bhambra’s 
meditation on imperial forgetting (Chapter 8, this volume), that to say that 
‘multiculturalism has failed’ in such a context is nothing less than a category 
error, for the state and the international order of which Europe is part are made 
of this multiculture. And yet, as the second of the two quotations above suggests, 
this misrecognition of European history involves persistent acts of differencing 
in the present, meaning that some cannot belong, and are disinherited from the 
very present that their presence made possible (see Mandel, 2008 for a provoca-
tive multidirectional analysis of xenophobia towards Turks in Germany). This is 
not the story of the ‘Turks in Europe’, as if they were a superficial and alien 
presence. Rather, this is the story of Europe. One of our interviewees at the 
Berlin Wall Memorial – a young Moroccan who had been raised in Germany – 
put this in other terms when talking about the heritage record:
For example, Turkish people back in the ‘60s I think when they used to 
work here, and their history has not really been told in the schools, or you 
know, I hear it from my friend’s family or like, I know there were black 
people, African people that came here as well in the war fighting. They are 
not really included in history as well. So, you only hear that kind of stuff, 
you know, from people that, families, and, like, other people. But in school 
you only learn about what happened in the, you know, the Cold War and 
when Hitler was, you know, ruling over Germany, but that’s the only history 
I really learned in school when I used to be here, when I was little.
(BW1, pers. comm., 2017, Anonymised) 
The history of the War casts a long shadow over such pasts, and yet in another 
view the failure of multiculturalism or the rhetoric of PEGIDA are inextricably 
connected to that same War and its aftermath of division, reconstruction and the 
reckonings with multiculture that come now, under the banner of crisis.
 In 2018, former British Museum director Neil MacGregor interviewed Hum-
boldt Forum Director Hartmut Dorgerloh for his BBC Radio 4 series As Others 
See Us, which explored attitudes to the UK from overseas. The interview 
touched upon the politics of Brexit. Dorgerloh commented: ‘I think the British 
are mourning; thinking that the past was better.’ This, he said, explained their 
desire to be independent from Europe and to leave the EU. But ‘in Germany, it’s 
the complete opposite’. Such an impulse to separate and to isolate oneself, to 
turn down a chance of transnational collectivity, would be inconceivable. 
Germany has to be part of a collectivised Europe.
 But which one? In fact, it is, once more, the certain Europe of the Negative 
Founding Myth; it is an endogenous Europe produced within a dimension of dif-
ficult history. It is not the global, porous, mutable Europe of exogenous forma-
tion or of deep multiculture, which are so critical to identity contests in Europe 
and to dissonant selves- in-history in the present. Our talks in the Kreuzberg kah-
vehane show us that other Europes are possible and other heritages can be 
222  Christopher Whitehead et al.
glimpsed, but only when we look again and see past, or against the grain of, the 
dominant backstories of the European present.
Towards new dimensions of heritage and memory? 
Suggestions for practice
Europe is like an old clock, you see – tick tock! It has always been the same 
since the… how would you say it in English? The Treaty, to have a conflict 
between different countries: the Treaty of Verdun in 843 between the three 
grandchildren of Charlemagne. You have always these two extremities of 
national identity and this dream of Europe.
(HEH3, pers. comm., 2017)
This book has argued through multiple contributions that heritage, as the sym-
bolic and inherently political valorisation of the past for the present and future, 
is a highly significant dimension of political organisation and cultural life in 
Europe, but with different meanings for different groups. It is far from being a 
simple part of our leisure time and economies and needs to be understood as a 
critical element within key social and political debates. As we have seen, at offi-
cial levels in European instrumental policy, heritage has often been used as a 
resource for collective identity, pride and sense of belonging as well as for place 
regeneration and the development of tourism potentials and economies. But heri-
tage is also manifest in people’s everyday practices and beliefs. It is at work in 
political mobilisations that sometimes counter official ideas of peaceful collec-
tivity. In these forms – for example in uses of the past in populist party- political 
or xenophobic discourses – it may instead reinforce senses of division and differ-
ence between groups.
 The European past itself is complex, and characterised as much by multiplic-
ity, the mobility of people and ideas, external influence, conflict and dissonance 
as it is by shared values, cultures and peace. It cannot be rewritten as a har-
monious and unified history that has produced a stable and singular European 
identity, and attempts to do this have had and will likely continue to have only 
patchy success. Although a range of official instruments promote a coherent nar-
rative of Europe, these often have little lasting purchase beyond the sphere of 
policy. They also fail to unify the plethora of different pasts from which people 
draw in order to frame both their identities and their preferred futures. By the 
same token, our research has shown that people’s historical, political and geo-
graphical understandings of Europe differ markedly, as do people’s attachments 
to different pasts and their desires about Europe’s future. In many ways, and at 
many different levels, from the informal spaces of people’s lives to public space 
and the sphere of policy, there are different ‘Europes’ being made all the time, 
through multiple dimensions of heritage and memory, and these sometimes come 
into antagonistic and even violent relationships. The chances of a widespread 
European collectivity that is both based on a shared history and respectful of 
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difference appear remote unless there is a change in orientation in heritage policy 
and practice.
 This is not distinct from the political crisis of Europe in which, according to 
some, ‘Europe as an idea is falling apart before our eyes.’ In January 2019, 30 
public intellectuals fronted by Bernard- Henri Lévy, Milan Kundera, Salman 
Rushdie, Elfriede Jelinek and Orhan Pamuk wrote a manifesto against the 
‘wreckers’, or ‘false prophets who are drunk on resentment and delirious at their 
opportunity to seize the limelight’. As they put it, ‘three- quarters of a century 
after the defeat of fascism and 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall there is a 
new battle for civilisation’. Their response was to reassert their faith in the ‘great 
idea’ of a Europe of peace that can ‘ward off the new signs of totalitarianism that 
drag in their wake the old miseries of the dark ages’ and to promote a ‘spirit of 
activism’ capable of overcoming resentment, hatred and the hijacking of 
history.11 If such activism were to articulate heritage practice it might well run 
the risk of looking like another instance of EU instrumentalism, with the inher-
ent likelihood of provoking contrary activism. Subtler, more questioning, genea-
logical and dialogical activism may help: how has the present come to be? What 
are the historical and genealogical roots of and pathways to conflict and contest 
in the present? Why are there dissonances and silences? What pasts underpin the 
unequal conditions of belonging and the effects of crisis?
 Heritage professionals are, we think, well aware of the social and political 
dynamics that inform audience engagements with the past. Many have a soph-
isticated sense of responsibility about managing the past in the present. They 
seek to achieve difficult balances, working with institutional missions to appeal 
to publics and communicate well, combined with the need to subsist in a 
visitor economy, meaning that they seek to capitalise on audiences’ interests in 
the past. Simultaneously, they recognise that what people want from the past 
may have political liabilities in the present. In some cases, this leads to 
anodyne presentations of the past in which its controversial dimensions or con-
temporary political relevance goes unexplored. There is an untapped potential 
to exploit key heritage phenomena (sites, materials, narratives, symbols, monu-
ments) as ways of tracing the histories of, and engaging with, contemporary 
social and political issues. Many museums and heritage sites do a good job of 
representing diversity, inequalities and plural perspectives. But this can be 
hard to do: on a tour of the newly- opened House of European History one of 
the chief curators commented that a key problem was the orchestration of a 
balanced history of Europe, attending also to national histories; and yet we 
learned from her that when taking around national- level officials they occa-
sionally complained about the relative lack of exposure in the museum of their 
countries, as if in competition with others for a place in the European heritage 
record. At the same time, the museum takes a questioning approach, asking, 
‘Is there a shared European past?’ And yet some visitors are not persuaded by 
such attempts at balance or interrogative rather than declarative approaches. A 
colleague of one of the current authors, upon return from Brussels, called the 
museum ‘blatant propaganda’.
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 Perhaps there are ways through this. Canonic histories of Europe – notwith-
standing their importance and value – need to be revisited and alternative forma-
tions explored. One reason for this is to increase the textures, richness and depths 
of the European heritage produced by and represented through official and insti-
tutional practice. Explorations of the ‘crossings’ of people and peoples, cultures, 
technologies, religions, ways of life across land, waterways, public and private 
spaces have already been experimented by some museums and sites, and their 
further refinement has the potential to counter views of European culture and 
identity as fixed, rooted and essential. An added dimension of this is to see 
Europe not as boundaried, territorial and static, but rather as never limited to 
itself; constantly in formation and subject to external influence; as transactional 
and made as much of vicissitude, movements and encounters as it is of purpose 
and tracts of land and sea. Europe and its locales might be conceived as both 
sites where cultural trajectories intersect and the origin points of global out-
goings, and for this to happen cross- border collaboration of the kind suggested in 
the concept of European Added Value, discussed above, would surely help. So 
too would extra- European collaborations to explore the complex global position-
ing and making of Europe in the world. This chapter, as well as Chapter 8, has 
also shown that heritage discourse and practice are implicated in misrecognitions 
of Europe’s diversity in relation to groups who are positioned as outsiders by 
their immigrant status, rather than as integral to the very formation of Europe. It 
is also worth pointing out that there are other silences in the European heritage 
record, most notably pertaining to gender. As editors of this book, we realised at 
different points of the writing process how gender – particularly relating to the 
positions, positioning and experiences of women in European history – is hard to 
find or downright silenced (except in a few instances such as the Women’s 
Museum in Aarhus, Denmark), in favour of a tacitly masculinised heritage. This 
is another fundamental discrepancy that should prompt a holistic re- framing of 
European heritage representations.
 While certain key conflicts (such as the World Wars of the twentieth century) 
have canonic status in heritage productions, it is important to diversify conflict 
as a paradigm of European history and to provide perspectives on less mono-
lithic, non- military conflicts, including those that range over civil, moral spir-
itual, social, cultural, intercultural and gender issues. A key approach here is to 
see conflict and contest as a habitual recurrence rather than as an aberration 
before resolution, reconciliation and closure. The civil benefit of this approach in 
the present is to provide anchor points for the understanding of contemporary 
conflicts and to provide opportunities to contrast them historically, potentially 
defusing or tempering responses to contemporary crises as unprecedented and 
unique, while problematising any view of Europe (or its locales) as once- pure 
places subsequently contaminated by difference. Europe, in a realist view, con-
tains divided memories and is made of difference, and at the political and civil 
level we suggest that this is not material to be harmonised or erased from history. 
A more proper civil project is to work to acknowledge, recognise and in some 
way process division – not to ‘resolve’ it – so that it becomes an accepted fact in 
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a situation of peaceful and respectful group relations. Rather than a demos based 
on a fictional history of eventual congruence, this is one that has a shared history 
of crossings and conflicts over a range of issues and interests. This seems deeply 
paradoxical – that division might be the grounds for commonality – but increased 
attention to the nature, historical depth and effects of difference, the idea of 
Europe as a ‘cultural space of difference’ may nevertheless offer opportunities 
for historical reflection and awareness upon which more plural senses of belong-
ing can be based.
 Just such an approach featured in the recent ‘Welcome to Jerusalem’ exhibi-
tion at the Jewish Museum Berlin, where multiperspectival contests and con-
trasts are offered up that do not smooth out difficulties or blandly pose a future 
where they magically dissipate. Of course, such an exhibition has deep reson-
ance in Berlin and in ‘European space’ more generally, but undertaking such a 
genealogy of conflict in a more obviously European frame may open up 
considerable insights and possibilities for social and political engagement on the 
part of audiences. If the past is contested, then let us make of those contests an 
object of attention for audiences, such that contest itself becomes heritage. This 
is, in a sense, a lateral interpretation of the Faro Convention’s insistence that the 
importance of heritage lies not so much in materials of the past but in the ‘mean-
ings and uses that people attach to them’12 and to propose that such meanings 
should be gathered, juxtaposed and presented as artefacts of a history of the 
present.
 Heritage practitioners are under pressure to manage the past in the present 
both within a tourist economy and with regard to a political context of instru-
mentalism, whether by government institutions or party politics. One feature of 
heritage practice is a tendency to segregate the past from the present, under-
standing it as concluded and therefore amenable to exhibition in museums or 
public remembering. An alternative perspective suggests that the past does not 
finish and runs into the present, and that even where a past seems remote, its 
meanings in the present are subject to continuous mutation and symbolic invest-
ment, including at the political level. The potential exists for heritage initiatives 
and museums to work creatively with a ‘past- in-present’ approach, seeking to 
unpick historical strands of contemporary phenomena, bringing historical narrat-
ives to bear on today’s concerns and asking questions about relationships 
between past and present, in order to encourage audiences to engage reflexively 
and critically with their own understandings of, and assumptions about, the past 
and its connections to the present. Crucially, heritage policy needs to find ways 
that are both soft and effective to make all of this happen. No amount of rhetoric 
will work or reset the gearings of heritage practice without significant financial 
investment, as the viable alternative to hard instruments that still recognises the 
centrality of heritage in political, public and private spheres. Another key diffi-
culty here is that heritage is not and cannot be contained within museums and 
heritage sites, which themselves attract a demographically limited audience. It 
circulates forcibly and productively through dimensions and through mediations 
of many kinds, including relatively uncontrollable ones like social media (see 
Figure 10.4  At the Jewish Museum Berlin, the Welcome to Jerusalem exhibition of 2018 
explored the histories of the city, intermixed with different, conflicting per-
spectives from inhabitants in the present and discussion of ongoing contro-
versies (including the US decision to move its Embassy to Israel from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem).
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Galani, Mason and Arrigoni 2019 for an overview). How then might soft heri-
tage policy have good effect outside of the walls and fences of official heritage? 
This is a question for future research.
 The entanglement of heritage in both the politics of togetherness and the pol-
itics of division needs to be recognised by contemporary heritage policy and 
practice. The purpose of this is not to eradicate the political dimensions of heri-
tage, which would be impossible because the very nature of heritage is political. 
Rather, it is to encourage people to develop more complex understandings of the 
European past, liable to counteract exclusive, xenophobic and antagonistic uses 
of it. It is also necessary to recognise that heritage practice is not, and cannot be, 
neutral. Ethical and political questions necessarily attach to heritage. The promo-
tion of peaceful civil relations based upon the idea that there may be some 
common heritages is a social good; but at the same time heritage can be divisive 
and used by actors to create or exacerbate contemporary social cleavages. We 
ignore this at the peril of constructing fictional heritages and mythic closures, 
blinding out historical connections that would help us to make sense of life and 
circumstance in the present. We now need a new orientation for European heri-
tage, which is to recognise and address historical situations of division, contest, 
conflict and exchange as formative of the richness of European cultures today.
Notes
 1 www.quora.com/Why- cant-all- the-countries- see-that- a-lot- of-refugees- dont-belong- 
in-Europe




 5 www.europanostra.org/our- work/campaigns/berlin- call-action/
 6 www.europanostra.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/09/Berlin- Call-Action- Eng.pdf
 7 https://cultureactioneurope.org/advocacy/fast- forward-heritage/
 8 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/18/brexit- climate-change- yemen-gaza- 
irish-backstop
 9 ‘Flag’ (Bayrak), the connotation of which in Turkish here is of an ethico- political 
compact transmitted by Atatürk to the Turkish people upon the founding of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923.
10 Our translations.
11 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/25/fight- europe-wreckers- patriots-
nationalist
12 www.coe.int/en/web/culture- and-heritage/faro- convention
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